The methodology ‘Theory of Distinctions’
It was a sort of risky attitude that let me propose some hypothetical solutions to the above uplisted problems from the point of view of the theory of distinctions.
First of all we had the problem of simplifying generalism with its aspect of integrating the general approach of the theory with its specific research capabilities. My proposal says: use the notion of distinctions. If you want to work with Luhmann’s proposal you know that you must use the system/environment-distinction, if you want to work with Parsons’ proposal you know that you must work with the system/action-distinction, if you want to work with Habermas’ proposal you know that you must use the Life-world/system-distinction. At the end one can abstract this procedure in the following way:
‘Tell me what distinction you are using, and I will tell you what you will see!’
And now you may ask: what is the main distinction of the theory of distinctions? Well, the distinct/distinctless-distinction. One main theorem of this theory says: without distinction there is no information. So, with the distinction of distinct/distinctless you arrive at the last distinction where you can observe that this distinction gives you the last information saying: if you take the distinctless side of the above distinction, you will not get any information at all. The only information you will get is, that you will not get any information.
Second we had the problem of the emptiness of central concepts of the theory-proposal of Luhmann, namely his concept of communication. Luhmann is making the same mistake as Parsons’ and Habermas have done with their main concepts: semantically overloading ‘communication’ (this holds for Luhmann), ‘action’ (this holds for Parsons) and ‘communicative action’ (this holds for Habermas). But what to do in this situation? My contention: there are no main concepts at all. My proposal: try to semantically restrict the concepts you use in a reciprocal way: one concept restricts the other an vice versa. For example we use – at the level of a culturalistic theory of society – the concepts ‘communication’, ‘action’, decision’, ‘structure’, ‘funcion’ and ‘evolution’ in an interrelated manner without giving to one of this concepts a priority (see beneath the figure).
Third we had the problem of the lack of empirical connection in Luhmann’s proposal. And I said that this has to do with his incorporation of the Autopoiesis-Concept in a ‘hard’ manner. The problem to which the Autopoiesis-Concept is offering a solution, can be stated in the following way: how can something constitute itself as itself? The plain answer that the Autopoiesis-Concept proposes is: the self is constituted by itself. In some way this problem is already tackled in Classical German Philosophy (for example in the works of Fichte). Before adapting the Autopoiesis-Concept Luhmann was already working with one of the main categories of this philosophy: with the category of self-reference. My proposal: insert some sort of time in the Autopoiesis-Concept so that it can be stretched in the sense that you can observe how something is transforming into a self. Take the Autopoiesis-Concept in a ‘soft’ manner and try to work more with the concept of ‘the evolution of autonomy’ so that you can detect degrees of autonomy, degrees of closeness.
Fourth we had the problem of the lack of internal theoretical changes by means of criticism of Luhmann’s proposal. This comes from the fact that Luhmann is using the paradoxical figure. I think that Luhmann (and others!) is right in pointing out that every identity when observed has a paradoxical form: the system is itself because it uses the distinction of being itself and not being itself in order to distinct itself . We can also say: the system is using the contrary of itself in order to become itself. Here there are some points to be remarked. First: you can dissolve every paradox with the help of time. More and better: a paradox is a timeless identity. If you observe with the help of time how the ‘you’ is constituting the ‘I’, and the ‘I’ is constituting the ‘you’, at the end you will understand that the process of the constitution of an identity is loaded with time. And so you will also understand why every observation of identity becomes paradoxical when extracting it from the dimension of time. Second: in daily life it is rarely possible to observe identities with the help of time. Or: in daily life there is no time to insert time in our observations of identities. So the paradoxical phenomena of identities will persist. Third: Something is paradoxical when our understanding of it comes to a cognitive limit. Or to put it in a paradoxical way: if you do not understand what I am saying when explaining a paradoxical relation you have already understood what this relation means: it means an abolishment of any means. Fourth: there is at least one more strategy that can help us dealing with the limits of cognitive understanding: the figure of complementarity as put forward by Niels Bohr, Viktor von Weizsäcker and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Complementarity means, that the identity of something has two sides that never can appear at the same time: the ‘I’ is only possible, if we disregard the ‘you’ and vice versa (12).
First of all we had the problem of simplifying generalism with its aspect of integrating the general approach of the theory with its specific research capabilities. My proposal says: use the notion of distinctions. If you want to work with Luhmann’s proposal you know that you must use the system/environment-distinction, if you want to work with Parsons’ proposal you know that you must work with the system/action-distinction, if you want to work with Habermas’ proposal you know that you must use the Life-world/system-distinction. At the end one can abstract this procedure in the following way:
‘Tell me what distinction you are using, and I will tell you what you will see!’
And now you may ask: what is the main distinction of the theory of distinctions? Well, the distinct/distinctless-distinction. One main theorem of this theory says: without distinction there is no information. So, with the distinction of distinct/distinctless you arrive at the last distinction where you can observe that this distinction gives you the last information saying: if you take the distinctless side of the above distinction, you will not get any information at all. The only information you will get is, that you will not get any information.
Second we had the problem of the emptiness of central concepts of the theory-proposal of Luhmann, namely his concept of communication. Luhmann is making the same mistake as Parsons’ and Habermas have done with their main concepts: semantically overloading ‘communication’ (this holds for Luhmann), ‘action’ (this holds for Parsons) and ‘communicative action’ (this holds for Habermas). But what to do in this situation? My contention: there are no main concepts at all. My proposal: try to semantically restrict the concepts you use in a reciprocal way: one concept restricts the other an vice versa. For example we use – at the level of a culturalistic theory of society – the concepts ‘communication’, ‘action’, decision’, ‘structure’, ‘funcion’ and ‘evolution’ in an interrelated manner without giving to one of this concepts a priority (see beneath the figure).
Third we had the problem of the lack of empirical connection in Luhmann’s proposal. And I said that this has to do with his incorporation of the Autopoiesis-Concept in a ‘hard’ manner. The problem to which the Autopoiesis-Concept is offering a solution, can be stated in the following way: how can something constitute itself as itself? The plain answer that the Autopoiesis-Concept proposes is: the self is constituted by itself. In some way this problem is already tackled in Classical German Philosophy (for example in the works of Fichte). Before adapting the Autopoiesis-Concept Luhmann was already working with one of the main categories of this philosophy: with the category of self-reference. My proposal: insert some sort of time in the Autopoiesis-Concept so that it can be stretched in the sense that you can observe how something is transforming into a self. Take the Autopoiesis-Concept in a ‘soft’ manner and try to work more with the concept of ‘the evolution of autonomy’ so that you can detect degrees of autonomy, degrees of closeness.
Fourth we had the problem of the lack of internal theoretical changes by means of criticism of Luhmann’s proposal. This comes from the fact that Luhmann is using the paradoxical figure. I think that Luhmann (and others!) is right in pointing out that every identity when observed has a paradoxical form: the system is itself because it uses the distinction of being itself and not being itself in order to distinct itself . We can also say: the system is using the contrary of itself in order to become itself. Here there are some points to be remarked. First: you can dissolve every paradox with the help of time. More and better: a paradox is a timeless identity. If you observe with the help of time how the ‘you’ is constituting the ‘I’, and the ‘I’ is constituting the ‘you’, at the end you will understand that the process of the constitution of an identity is loaded with time. And so you will also understand why every observation of identity becomes paradoxical when extracting it from the dimension of time. Second: in daily life it is rarely possible to observe identities with the help of time. Or: in daily life there is no time to insert time in our observations of identities. So the paradoxical phenomena of identities will persist. Third: Something is paradoxical when our understanding of it comes to a cognitive limit. Or to put it in a paradoxical way: if you do not understand what I am saying when explaining a paradoxical relation you have already understood what this relation means: it means an abolishment of any means. Fourth: there is at least one more strategy that can help us dealing with the limits of cognitive understanding: the figure of complementarity as put forward by Niels Bohr, Viktor von Weizsäcker and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Complementarity means, that the identity of something has two sides that never can appear at the same time: the ‘I’ is only possible, if we disregard the ‘you’ and vice versa (12).
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